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RESUMEN 
En este trabajo se desarrolla y estima un modelo para explicar los motivos por los cua-
les algunos países europeos prosperaron más rápidamente que otros en el período 1860-
1910. El modelo cuantifica por dos vías distintas los factores que contribuyeron a las 
diferencias de ingreso entre España y Gran Bretaña. Los determinantes que se consideran 
más significativos son los recursos naturales, la política económica y la herencia cultural 
reflejada en los niveles educativos. 
ABSTRACT 
A model is developed and estimated to explain why some European countries were 
richer than others between 1860 and 1910 and why some increased their prosperity faster 
in the period. The model quantifies by two methods some of the contributors to the inco-
me gap between the economies of Spain and Britain in 1880 and 1910. Determinarits of 
European nations' output per head induded natural endowments (climate and coal depo-
sits), economic policy (tariff protection and very marginally the gold standard), and cultu-
ral heritage as reflected in literacy. Measurement errors, country specific factors and per-
haps variables not considered in diis analysis account for less than half Spanish-UK meóme 
differences at the dates estimated. 
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By the later nineteenth century, European economies were clearly embarked on 
a period of sustained economic development. National outputs per head all rose, 
albeit at different rates and from various levéis. Distinctive languages, cultures and 
institutions favoured clear national identities. On the other hand freedom of move-
ment of people, ideas and goods across frontiers, coupled with radically improved 
transport and Communications facilities, encouraged a convergence of national eco-
nomies. The gold standard and the most favoured nation clause, together with the 
railway, the steamship and the telegraph, were the nineteenth century framework for 
the rapid diffusion of economic development. European economies were therefore 
likely to share a similar pattern of change and growth. That is the precondition for 
modelling their nineteenth century development. In this present attempt to do so, 
the central questions are why some European countries were richer than others bet-
ween 1860 and 1910 and why some increased their prosperity faster in the period. A 
satisfactory model would answer these questions. In particular the model should 
show what characteristics contributed to income gaps, such as that between the eco-
nomies of Spain and Britain. Even if existing estimates of real national product per 
head are only approximately correct, the variations to be explained are substantial; 
in 1860 the wealthiest country was more than three times richer than the poorest in 
the sample analysed here and in 1910 the gap had widened to four times'. 
Section I gíves a selective four part summary of the literature which the pro-
posed model of European economic development is intended to illuminate. Section 
II identifies the most fundamental terms of an economic historical explanation for 
development and goes on to classify the possible endogenous variable set. The third 
section then specifies the model and describes the data on which it is tested and 
from which the parameters are estimated. The results and their implications are 
reported in section IV. 
I. THE HISTORIOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
Comparative European economic history that explains, as well as describes, 
events and outcomes, requires some theory One event may foUow or be associated 
' Lains' (1992) examination of the reliability of GDP estimates for 1913 shows a similar range of 
variation in that year. The widening gap is probably a consequence of the increasing range of countries 
in the sample. In the early years of the period few estimates for the low income economies were available. 
Thus although the gap had persisted for many earlier decade, it was only in 1906 that Prokopovitch 
began a vigorous debate on Russian economic performance with his claim that Engiish income per head 
was four and a half times Russia's (Studenski (1958), p. 145-6). Gregory's (1982) figures suggest Russian 
real national income per head grew by 60 per cent 1860-1910, but stagnatcd for the first thirty years. The 
British growth figure was very similar So the Russian-UK gap had probably been greater in the 1870s. 
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with another but a causal connection cannot be inferred without some prior, 
necessary, link berween them. Otherwise the association may be merely a matter of 
chance. Even when the historian is armed with theoretical reasons for connections, 
magnitudes and relative contributions cannot usually be inferred. That requires 
quantification of variables and of relationships between them. The cumulative 
efforts of researchers now permit tentative steps in this direction and, in taking 
them, the testing of previous conjectures and hypotheses. 
One of the earliest supposed explanations for European economic development 
in the nineteenth century was in fact description (not necessarily accurate); the 'lea-
der and follower' scheme. In this account Britain experienced the first industrial 
revolution which boosted her productivity in manufacturing and income above 
those in the rest of Europe, and then, with varying alacrity, other European econo-
mies adopted similar technology and work organisation. The pace at which they did 
so determined the lag in real income behind Britain. Keywords in this representa-
ron, associated in particular with Rostow (1960), Landes (1970), Pollard (1981), 
Gerschenkron (1966), are 'discontinuity', 'diffusion' and 'backwardness' (O'Brien 
1986) 2. Explanations for income differences should then turn on the determinants 
of the speed of adoption, but that was not usually discussed in any detail. Since it 
was widely assumed the new technology could only be adopted if more capital was 
available, growth models of the 1950s and 1960s encouraged and reflected this 
approach to economic development by assigning a central place to capital accu-
mulation, savings ratios and 'traverses' between long run equilibrium growth paths. 
What undermined these conceptions was the quantification of European eco-
nomic development that was proceeding simultaneously. Subsequent empirical 
research has proved mythical 'discontinuities', 'take-offs' or 'great spurts' in natio-
nal European economic development. Higher shares of production goods in the 
output of more backward countries, larger plant scale, greater roles for investment 
banks and diminished contributions from agriculture, have been shown equally chi-
merical (Milward and Saúl (1973), (1977)); SyUa and Toniolo (1991). The big leap 
in capital accumulation actually was necessitated not by manufacturing but by 
infrastructure, in particular by railways, which in Britain accounted for a far higher 
proportion of the capital stock than manufacturing until the interwar years 
(Feinstein and Pollard 1988). 
During the later 1970s, the 'alternative roads' school began to erode the 'lea-
ders and foUowers' approach. The numbers suggested that Britain was different 
and that other paths to development could be, and were, taken. The French did 
' Gerschenkron's representation focussed on industrial production whereas Rostow referred to 
GDR 
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not lag behind British economv as far as haA r..^ • i , 
to avoid so . e of the P-ble JofIX^,^^^^^^^^^^^^^ - d .anaced 
and Keyder 1978). Britain's great emnh.ci '"f^^^rial development (O'Brien 
period (Crafts 1984). Though co iTafa L " '''' " " T"^"^ ' ^^-"^hout the 
allowed rapid development, even without i nd i , ^ ' ' " ^ ' ' " " ' " '"P"^- ^' 
Scandinavia, based upon ad;ancedrdustrid Í " " 1 ' ^ '^'P^^"^' ^^P- '^"^ ^ 
(Sandberg 1982; Cameron 1985)' M^t 1 1 ^ '^'' ^"^^*" '^"^^'^ ^^  "^^l- t 
alternative pattems of development for tU ' ° " ' T ° " ^ ^''"'^ "^^^ ^^^^ P'otted 
Adelman (1988). In addition to European c ' " " ' u ' ' ° '''' ^ ^ ^ - ^ - d 
four "very poor» countries, two I Z ' Z Z Z ^ ' ^ ^'^ " "^^^ '"^'"'^^^ J ^ P ^ ' 
recent European setdement. With the help of 35 ""'"' ' ^''"'" """"'"^^ «^ 
principal components analysis, they find five de I " " ^ " ^ ^°'" ^ ^^ "^  ^"""^'"y "^^ ^ 
agricultural and one "balanced" But the sel J f " ^ ' ^ ^ " ? ^ ' ^ ' ' "^^ '"^"^"''' ' ^° 
tricted and arbitrary. ' ' " ° " °^ mdicators is somewhat res-
A third group of writers largelv reiertPrl í^ i 
from economics. FoUowing traditional e c o n o m ™ ! ? " ' ^ " "^^^"'^^ ^ P " " ^ ' ^ 
of mstitutions. Although these writers were tvni .."^^ '^^y ^mphasized the role 
Europe as a whole, they did consider conceoí r.l " ° ' T ' ^ ' ' ' ^ ^ ^°"^^^"^d ^«h 
nomic development. Chandler (1990) a d d r / ! ) T " ° , ^ ' "^^ ^"^"Pean eco-
development in relation to the United States F I K " " T ^ ^ " ' " ^ " 
business 
tricted themselves among European cnJ! T '"'^ ^''°"'<^k (1986) res-
European experience to contribute " o 7 h t " 7 ' ' " ' " ' ^ ° " ^ '^^«l ' - e d 
only one element in Olson s (1982) great s c h l T '"^"^""ons and Europe was 
Europe, in a comparative perspective -^""'^ *^^^'' 1^88) did focus on 
Pohtical institutions are identified as the kev m 
remarkable unanimity by authors of recent J n , ^ ' ° " ° ' ^ ' ' development with 
Europe in their coverage. Rosenberg and B ^ H i r r " " " ' ' ' ^ ' ' ^ " " ^ ^ ^^ '^'^  ¡"dude 
question why the West becamerichisbvexn ^ ' ^ ^^°^^ ™ - to the 
particular 'autonomy of the economic sphere f^"' K '"" '"^ '^"^ ^"^^""'"y'- i" 
mamtammg that accumulation of wealth b ' 1 T / P°^"'^' ' ' J°"^^ <1988), 
strong and universal human propensity answer ^ ' " ' '"'^ ^oll.cüvéy, is a 
way too much m the West, ehher by wars and J '• ^ °^""™-^ did not get L the 
t.on thanks to a fairly wide dispersL o M i " 7 " " " '^ ^ "^"^''^'™ - ^ taxa-
simdar tack, agreeing on the primacy of the s te ' ° " " - ' '^"^™" 'l^»^) takes a 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' " "^^""8 fevourable conditions. 
an earher penod. See Krantz (1988) " ' '"««"^' ^weden's high literacy 
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He asserts that states controUed by mercantile interests were those that pursued the 
most appropriate policies. . , , 
Kennedy (1987) contended that the peculiarities of the London capital market 
distorted British economic development. All these 'new institutionahst authors, 
offer plausible accounts but the demonstrations of their propositions are not rigo-
rous. Thus from an industry by industry analysis, Chandler maintains that Bntains 
failure to develop large integrated firms with professional manageri^ hierarchies 
from 1880, unlike the US and to a lesser extent Germany, ^''Pl^^""! ^ " " ' ' ' / " J ' ; 
lity to hold her economic lead. Adopting a similar approach to Chandler s, tnat 
hypothesis can be tested by considering whether all US world class firms were orga-
nised in professional managenal hierarchies. Ford untü the 1930s ^\^f^^^"' 
example. Before 1914, Ford foremen were able to hire and fire and untü the 192Us 
the company was run as a family busmess foUowing the f^^^'^^f^P^^^J'''!!'•;" 
than those based on rational professional analysis (Wilkins and Hills 1964; Mey r 
1981). Yet for much of the first quarter of the century Ford dommated the world 
motor industry primarily because of the ability to gain economies of scale 
learning, by supplying the US farm market. ,^„^ ,„^rp 
Managenal hierarchies in which Britam, and most of the rest «f Europe we 
deficient, were not essential for success. Inertia in the face of a ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
environmem plausibly explains a part of the interwar decline of Britain s cotton 
mdustry and more generally may well be a factor preventing the « P " - " - '^^ '^ ^^^ 
ment of market institutions (as Lazonick has consistendy mmntained)^ But that does 
not tell US how much of differential real income levéis in Europe should be attri-
buted to this influence. , . . . a^^^ (mm the 
Olsons no less plausible theory of distributional coalitions - f ^ - J - ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
same drawbacks. Within national economies, these ' ^«^^^"«" tT c f of sho^ ^^ ^^  
stronger and more pervasive with the passage of time and m the absence o shock. 
They redistnbute L o m e towards themselves, and in so ¿^-^^'t^J^^^^^Í 
development. Much of 19th century European history does not ^^fj^^'^^^^ 
Olson s account. The formation of the ZoUverein in 1834 may hav been a sdutary 
economic shock for Germany, but the unification of Ita^y does not ^PP - « ' ^ -
worked a similar miracle. France regularly experienced po itical -P^^^^^¡^^^^ 
Britain's constitutional change was a comparatively tranquil ^^^^^^^^^^^1^^^ 
not match British income per head. Spain, with 58 governments ^ ^ «3 — M . 
pubHc finance between 1868 and 1915 (Platt 1984, p. 107), was ^^^^^^¡^J^^^ 
unstable governments. These shocks to Spain were not obviously benign mfluences 
on long run growth. , rr ^,. _f olson's 
What is needed is some estímate of the pervasiveness and f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
"sclerotic institutions". Pencavels (1977) calculation of the effects of British 
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msation of the cod industry on productivity in the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tu:y . supported by a plausible model that fits the data, but the example shows one 
of the rol., of quanttfKatton despite such institutional sclerosis British meóme and 
productmty was generally higher than elsewhere in Eurooe Oknnl K 
weU have considerable explanatory power . t h o u t ^ ^ : ^ : : ^ 
ferences between European countries and over time in incomes per h ad 
A variation on the 'new institutionalism' theme is 'nath Hen^n^ . 
ergodic growth'; a (unique) event, policy or instkut 1 Ín7 ^Z '",°' " ° " ' 
period changes the state of an e c o n o m ^ p ™ 1 n h e Í H ' " T 
Growth, then, is largely determined by events anrin^dtu " ' ""'"Í' 
If this is so it might seem that no genLal e x D l " ! T ' " ^ ' • ' ' ' ' ° " ' P'"°'^'-
sible. But still generalisations may b T a p p t p t eToVr^^^ ' " " ' '' '°'-
In practice the concept can degeneratfto ^re of I ' ' " ' ' ' " ' " ' ^ ' ^ ° ' ^ " 
sible, t y p e s o f h i s t o r i c . e x p l a n L n , í o : h : c ^ t t : S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
theory, causal ordering is inferred from temporal order T ' - '^^f'T"' °^ 
course contam mformation about causal ordermg b " ' : ela^^^^ ° ' 
tations) the arrow of time onlv flies in on. A ?T ^ ' ' '^"°""« '^^ P '^^ " 
dependenceisthetradttton^i^te'Id^^^^ 
development which suggests ^l^ZrZ^^XÍ::^::''^!: ^ - - h econom. 
land during the French Revolution (Carón 1979 n 3 7 í t --^df "^ution of 
me distribution and electorally significant „„^ , ' ' \^ ' '^ ' "°^^^8^1"ar ian inco-
encouraged savings pattems and stfte p i e L e Í ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ' " " ' T " T ^ ^ " ^ 
in France than in Britain. How much c ^ be a t t ^ r d t T ' ' ' " ' " " ' ' 
tingent condúions can be judged from Le^^Ub 1 I d T '^^^'^^^''^^^y' - " " 
econometric model. The answer seems to be not m t - ^"^^Bourguignon's (1990) 
more dynamic than industry, contributina tU ' ^8"^ "^ "^>"e ^^s apparently 
growth between 1825 and 7859 L e ^ T e l f "^^^^^ °'.^^^ ^^^^^ — ^ ' ^ 
thts instance quantification hints Z . C m ^ ^ Z T r T ' ' ^^  ' ' ' ' '" 
ventional accounts. ""'crent path dependence from con-
Harking back to the earlier literature on F 
rical economic analyses of growth exDerienn T ™ ^ ^ ? development, recent empi-
mulated by a new wave of modeilini^iniH^rJu' ^ ^ P ^ ' ^ '^"""t'-ies have been sti-
that there had been a general t fndenr to ' " ' " ° ' ' ^''''^ ^ " ^ P ^ ^° ^how 
per head of industrial countries B a n m ^ ' T ' ^ " " " ' '*""" ^^^^ ^'"«"g GNPs 
slowdownofthel980swaspartofthenat I í ^^' ' ^ ' ' ' ^ ' " ^ productivity 
for the post-1945 period simUarly had tried'to T - ^ ^ " " ^ " ^^"'^ of modeUing 
by an inability to take advantage of the nr«^ ^ "" " ^ ' ° ' ' °f preeminence 
' '^' productmty gams from reallocating resour-
' An obsen-ation on which the econometrics of Cr^n 
of Granger causality places great we.ght 
446 
\ MODEL OF LATER NINETEENTH C.ENTURY EUROPEAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
ees from agriculture to industry, because the redistribution had already taken pla-
ce. This sectoral distinction is at the heart of Arthur Lewis' model of economic 
development with unlimite supplies of labour. That model formed the basis ot 
many subsequent analyses of economic growth in poorer countnes and 
Kindleberger (1964) has argued that it is a means of understanding Western 
European development over a longer period. Only Levy-Leboyer and Bourgignon s 
dual economy model has taken up the suggestion for the nmeteenth century. 
Most recent models explain the rate of economic growth or the level of meóme by 
mean of cross-section regression of national data', sometimes pooled ^^^ t i " . " ^ " ^ ' 
Extending Baumol's sample beyond the data avaüable in Maddison (1982), m pam^ 
cular including economies such as Argentme and Chüe (high meóme -un t r es m the 
nmeteenth century with poor twentieth ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f ^ : 
question any tendency for general convergence (De Long iv»»;. w , 
also risen again with a regression showing that whether a country was P-dommandy 
Protestant determined whether or not it joined the high meóme club (De Long 
1988). The post-1960 period has been subject to the most mtensive analysts^An 
aggregate production function with 'catch up' terms explains a s.gmftcant proportion 
of intercountry variation in average growth rates over these years ( ^ ^ ^ ™ ^ 
There is some reason to suppose that the ability of countrtes 'o^t^^l^^^^^ 
backwamess depended on mfrastructure and on population growth. Those ^^onoim^ 
not showing signs of convergence experienced high populauon growth ^^J^^^^ 
high ratios of young dependants to d.e total work forcé. D-ggregauon - t o ^^^^^^ 
and agticultural s e i r s revealed substantial intersectorial dtfferences - t e t ó P ^ 
gress, and disequilibrium in factor markets (Dowrick and Gemmel 991h Un 
school enrolment rates (a proxy for human capital) were taken ^'^^^T^'^l 
sample of 98 countries between 1960 and 1985, growth rates were --^^^^^'f^l^ 
to the initial level of 1960 real GDP per head, as convergence '"^'i;;^^ J ^ ^ ^ 
Theoretical'support'for the convergence hypothests lagged behind^^^^^^^^ 
analyses but eventually models with convergence -p l - i t ly /erived fe^^^^ 
classtcal growth model were esttmated (Barro and Sala-t-Martm ^^^ ^ "bw 
RomerandWeni993).Thts model assumesthee^^^^^^^ 
wed to adjust to changes external to the model. Henee tne IIKC 
the more fundamental conditions that made 'catehing up ^^^'^'^^^ J^lm''' 
(and after 1945), was the 'Bretton Woods' regime of fatrly hberal ^^f^^Zd 
tary relations. This was condueive to the diffusion of techmques ,ust as w s thejoM 
standard period before 1914. In Europe, openness to other ^^l^^'^^'^^ 
Partners and to rest of the world by 1914 had in many cases -^^^edjej^^^^^^^^^ 
Parable to those after 1960. National priee changes were not ^^^f^^'^ ¡ 
espeaally bearing in mind the limitations and comparabUity of the avadable 
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numbers, and intra-European labour flows were substantial; there were more 
Italian and Belgian workers in France in 1911 than in 1982, if official statistics are 
to be believed. The simÜarity between the conditions under liberal gold standard 
regime and those of the Bretton Woods system and later modifications presents a 
prima facie case therefore that, data permitting, comparable methods of analysis to 
those employed for the post 1960 years may be appropriate for Europe between 
1860 and 1914. 
II. THE KEY VARIABLES IN EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT 
However a good deal of empirical economics is concerned with testing models 
'received' from theory and these are not necessarily ideally adapted for histórica] 
explanation. The factors and parameters of the neoclassical production function 
— the level of human and physical capital, the fertÜity of the soÜ, and perhaps also 
the size of the labour forcé, and the adoption of technology— themselves need 
explaining. Explanation must then be pushed back to what determines factor sup-
plies and production parameters. 
The first stage of modeUing then is to identify the relevant variables Figure 1 is 
a classification of the most general causes of economic growth into exogenous and 
endogenous sets. Technology is at least predetermined, for what can be achieved in 
a given penod is largely dependent upon earlier progress in related technologies 
Even such an apparendy low-technology development as the safety bicycle of the 
1880S depended upon prior metaUurgical development in light but strong tubine 
and for cham links, in (wheel) bearings, in rubber and in pneumatic tyres ^ 
Technology is however embodied in capital, which is certainly an endogenous varia' 
ble, and to some extent can be advanced by research and development expenditure 
Moreover it is extremely difficult to represent in an abstract summary fashion other 
than through the production function. Assuming rapid diffusion of technical know 
ledge among European economies, we can treat the most abstract notion of tech 
nology as a common element across countries, and embodied in capital with the Das 
sage of tiine. Possibly a diíference from American technology was that the European 
variety, if one existed, was less natural resource-intensive, was directed to smaller 
markets and was more skill-intensive and so capital-saving (Nelson and Wright 
1992). But here we are concerned only with intra- European technology differences. 
the athletic prowess necessary even to get into the saddle. handlebars, and 
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FIGURE 1 
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Natural resources in the form of coal deposits are one possible explanat.or. for 
the pattern of European development in the nineteenth century, detern^ining the 
availability of power and heat for transport and industrial processes (Cameron 
1985). Abundant coal supposedly allowed precocious development. Trade rnay 
or may not have compensated for differential coal endowments. Even within coun _ 
tries location could be a vital influence upon coal prices. Just before the openmg ot 
the period of study, in England of 1843 coal prices in the dearest ' ^ ° " " ™ / ; / ; " ^ 
times those of the cheapest (Crafts 1985, p. 68). Jevons (1906) contended that the 
Price advantage of British coal in the 1860s had been lost to Pennsylvama and mat^  
ched by Germany by the end of the century. His data show France paying one third 
more than her coal-endowed European competitors. 
Climate is a more neglected natural resource (with the recent e -ep t ^ ° 
Tortella (1994)). The properties of the soil are strongly influenced by^he way lU 
cropped, irrigated or dramed. But rainfall and temperature at d.fferent t"-^^ °^jh^ 
year is an almost entirely natural endowment which determines ^f^^^fj^^ 
ductivity correspondmg to the class.cal definition of the factor land. " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
is concentrated in a small number of days, as in Southern Europe, -hen orrennd 
rain is followed by drougth, moisture evaporates in a few hours ^here- ^ 
Northern Europe, more rainfall over more days with lower temperatures mamtams 
soil moisture, alfafa, ryegrass and clover grow thick and nch. Cows sheep nd 
draught antmals flounsh on such a diet. Henee climate ts a determinan of the a i ^ 
nials to land ratio that Slicher van Bath (1963) and O'Brien and ^eyder 1978 hav 
emphasized as underlying high crop yields. Soil quality is not "^erely a natural 
resource; it can be depleted or accumulated by agricultural investmem. Hot dry 
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summers impose a cost in the form of investment in irrigation. On the other hand 
higher temperatures alone may allow a greater cash yield per acre. Irrigation and 
drainage, crop mixes and fertilisers can substitute for nature's deficiencies but not 
at zero cost. Countries with more favourable climates still possess an agricultura! 
productivity advantage''. 
Most abstract among the more obvious pre-determining variables are culture 
and religión. Max Weber's thesis that the rational spirit of protestantism encoura-
ged capitalism found some support from De Long's 'Protestantism' regression, but 
a more systematic Índex would be desirable. There is some French evidence'that 
the nineteenth century development of religious practices may have influenced the 
acquisition of reading skills (Carón 1979). Much later, Protestants in France achie-
ved far higher proportions of top managerial and professional Jobs than their 
minority representation in the French population warranted (Yoshimuri 1988) 
That is consistent with the hypotheses discussed here but in the absence of more 
general developments in comparative quantitative religious or cultural history the 
presumed consequences of these factors must be employed as potential 'ultímate' 
—or exogenous— explanations instead. 
Quantification of political regimes is easier in some respects than religión and 
culture. The taxation they impose —both levéis and forms—, their propensity to 
wage war, their monetary arrangements, can be statistically summarised and com 
pared across economies. However the different delegations of taxation below central 
govemment m practice means that readily available data is likely to measure the 
degree of federalism as much as the weight of taxation. Included in regimes and cío 
sely related to taxation, govemment spending, and the political constitutión is the 
monetary order. Countries unable to balance their budgest were liable to use fíat 
currencies or currencies at a discount to their nominal metaUic valúes Even those 
countries which maintained metaUic links were not immune from monetary disorder 
and the consequent adverse impact on business. Both silver and bimetallic currencies 
were in difficulties because of changing relative prices of gold and silver from the 
mid-century. Turning to purely political measures, a genuine measure of democracy 
m pnnciple may be possible also, though requiring considerable work Much more 
problematic is the quantification of differences in institutions across Europe Much 
of this vanauon must be ascribed to unique, country-specific, influences on growth 
That completes the list of non-economic variables in abstract that are exoee' 
nous to an economic model of economic development ^ First among the obvious 
That is not necessarily the same as being actually exogenous The li,r i» n ^ / u j r 
more general political or social model. "genous, l he list is not exhausted for a 
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endogenous, or more proximate, variables is physical capital; higher income eco-
nomies créate, or have had created for them, more capital. In the later nmeteeijth 
century, apart from land and buildings, that meant primarily raÜways. Capital also 
embodied new techniques, or rather gross investment in any period did. Ihe 
second form of produced factor of production is human capital; the education. trai^  
ning, skills and traits embodied in the work forcé. As already discussed nationd 
valúes of the variables reflect institutional and cuhural influences which must 
remain implicit or residual and exogenous in this, but not necessardy m later, 
' " ' líe'structure of industry is yet another endogenous variable, determined by the 
growth process; with rising incomes the pattern of demand changes and as part ot 
the supply response, resources flow to new places of work and activity These may 
vary in their productivity potential and so in their contribution to economic deve^ 
lopment. The dual economy, with an advanced and a traditional sector may be a 
consequence and a cause of later nineteenth century European economic growth. 
III. MODEL STRUCTURE AND EUROPEAN CHARACTERISTICS 
Assessing whether there was a common development process across European 
countries and over time can be tested by estimating the a. P^'r'T'Jl-^^ 
model in Figure 2. A typology aims to predict (but not explam) the charactenst^ 
mix Ia.X from given v l e s of Y, the level of real income per head or developrnen 
(Chene^ and Syrquin 1975; Crafts 1984; Molinas and Prados 1989 , -^^^J,"^^^ 
predicts Y from valúes of X. By contrast with a typology, if a causal Pa«emj iden-
tified then it will support counterfactuals; the valúes of the P^^^-^^^'^^fj^^ 
change when the explanatory variables alter, either in history or m a thought expe-
riment u i 
The relationships m Figure 2 are of two types. They may represent behaviou^ 
directly, such a labour supply equation, in which case they are « ^ - ^ t ^ ^ ™ ^ ^ 
equations are the buildíng blocks of a complete explanation. ^^"^^^¿^^ 
relationships of Figure 2 summarise the impact of ^^^^^^^'"'^ f ^ ^ l ^ ^ Z d -
ned outside the model (exogenous) on the (endogenous) variable ^-^¡^^^^¡^^ 
they are reduced form equations. Reduced form equations show ^^e e tect ot «le 
exogenous variables upon the endogenous variable set. They are ^^^^^^^l^ 
tions in themeselves, for they do not explicitly include the mutual interaction ot 
endogenous variables in the structural equations. „^„Unatinn is 
Tlie historian observes or creates a set of data rom which ^^^P^^^'^^^ 
constructed. In principie both structural and reduced form relationships can be fitted 
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FIGURE 2 
A Scheme for Explaining Late Nineteenth Century European Development 
Real GNPper head 
Y, 
Country 1 at beginning of decade 1 
Y, = a,X„ + ajX,2+... + e, 
national peculiarities, policies. svents, 
pan-European explanatory variables 
X 
1) 
institutlons and measurement errors 
Country 2 at decade 1 or country 1 at decade 2 
Y, = a,Xj,+ ajX,,+... + e, 
Y3 = a,X3,+...+ 63 
Structural equations; Y = f(Z), Z 
or reduced forms; Y = h(X). 
-^ 
= g<X) where Z^ are intermedíate variables 
to the data to represent the explanations formaEy. But although there may be a unique 
reduced form equation that fits the data best, a number of alternative structural rela-
tions might nevertheless be encompassed by the same reduced form; a variety of 
explanations can be consistent with the same body of evidence (observational equi-
valence). Supposing a reduced form indicates that coa! availability influenced 
European nineteenth century GDP, we may still want to know the channels by which 
it did so, whether directly through manufacturing consumer goods or indirectly 
through lowering the costs of capital goods and transport. These channels are repre-
sented by structural equations. Whether structural parameters can be inferred from 
the reduced form is the identification problem. If we are only interested in 'retrodic-
tion', forecasting what would have happened had the exogenous valúes been different, 
without explaining, then we need pay no attention to the structural relations and their 
identification, unless to seek confirmation that the reduced form is correct. 
Gerschenkron's notion of substitute for alleged preconditions of European 
nineteenth century development draws attention to the variety of different valúes of 
X, that are compatible with a given valué of Y in Figure 2. In this framework suf-
ficient conditions are easier to model than necessary". Backwardness or 'catching 
" Even such a simple model can be iised to expose the weakness of Weber's (1961, pp. 258-60) 
demonstration of the causes of the rise ot capitalism. His argument has the form; Xl,. . . X4 are all asso-
ciated with Y in the West, but we can find cases where XI ... X3 are not associated with Y elsewhere. 
Therefore X4 must be the cause. It was not population growth (XI) because population grew in ('hiña 
without having that effect, it was not the inflow of precious metal from the New World (X2) because a 
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up' as a positive influence on the potential for raising income (Y) can be represen-
ted by a term Y/Y, or Y - Y, where Y is the GNP per head of the follower 
country. But then what is to be explained, Y, is also part of the explanation. This 
can be seen from equation (1) describing the aim of the paper; to explain why some 
countries (Y.) were richer than others (Y) in later nineteenth century Europe. 
Y,-Y, = a,(X„-X„) + a , (X, -X, ) + ... + (e.-e,)(l) 
In the present scheme income differences between any pair of economies are 
explained systematically by two types of influences; differences in valúes of pan-
European variables (Xj, X ,^...) and the pan-European parameters (a,, a ,^...) that link 
these variables with incomes. A representation of follower j's income by a "catch-
up" variable, the difference in income between leader i and follower j , merely 
uses the above equation as one explanatory term. However, since the X and their 
parameters a. are not made explicit in practice, the full equation (la) is not speci-
fied, the exercise remains descriptiva rather than explanatory. 
Y, = b, (Y, - Y,) = b, (a,(X„ - X,,) + a,(X,, - X ,^) + ... + (e, - e)l (la) 
Similarly, an explanation for the growth rate of economy with a "catch-up" 
term is equivalent to accounting for the current level of the economy's income with 
the lagged terms on the right hand side of equation (1) and a lagged valué of that 
economy's income. In short it fails to expose the causes of growth. 
The non-systematic part of the explanation is measured by random error 
terms, e¡ - e for any pair i and j and encapsulates country-specific influences, as 
well as differences in income measurement errors. In his discussion of why England 
experienced an industrial revolution before France, Crafts (1977) maintained the 
valúes of the relevant X were similar in the two countries and therefore the expla-
nation was to be sought in the e. If history could be replicated a hundred or a thou-
sand times then on half of these occasions, France would have been first. The 
problem in that instance is that we have only one observation. In the present 
representation, country specific influences, such as styles of government, may well 
comparable inflow to India from the Román Empire did not cause Indian capitalism, it was not the geo-
graphy of European rivers (X3) and the inland sea of the Mediterranean because capitalism did not 
emerge under the Greek and Román Empires. Instead it was the rational spirit which gave rise to the 
rational enterprise, accounting, technology and law. But we might imagine that if, say XI and X2, or 
even X5, took a number of difterent valúes (they were not merely binary), then Y might have been di-
fferent in the rest of the world also and that the association between Y and X4 was merely a matter of 
chance or even reverse causation. 
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be ultimately traceable to historical unique events which could be described as 
chance. But in that case the replication of history would have to cover a period of 
more than a century, not merely a few critical decades at the end of the eighteenth 
century. 
A systematic understanding of nineteenth century European economic deve-
lopment requires an elaboration of the model of Figure 2. The structure adopted is 
a production function and factor supply and demand equations \ In addition, 
variations in the quality of the labour input Cillit') and in the sectorial distribution 
may well have contributed to output. The production function may be thought of 
as disaggregated into 'traditional' (A, agriculture) and 'modern' (M, urban or 
manufacturing) sectors. In Figure 3 (from Williamson (1991)), a fixed quantity of 
labour is divided between the demands of the two sectors. When payments match 
sectoral marginal productivities at w then labour is distributed between sectors so 
as to maximise productivity The more common position may have been where 
marginal productivity in the more advanced sector was higher than in agriculture, 
at w^ and w^  respectively An increase in demand for the producís of the advanced 
sector in this model shifts upwards that sector's demand for labour (to D ) but 
only reallocates labour between the sectors if the marginal productivity gap is not 
allowed to widen. So long as there is such a gap, labour migration out of agriculture 
raises the efficiency term of the aggregate production function. Whether agricul-
tural labour productivity was actually lower on average in Europe may then be tes-
ted, and the consequences of rallocating labour between sectors measured, by 
including a sectoral distribution of the labour forcé variable. If the terms of trade 
shifted against the traditional sector, because of cheaper agricultural imports for 
instance, the gains from shifting labour into the advanced sector are increased. 
When sectorial marginal productivities are equal, and there are no shifts in the 
terms of trade for external reasons, then there are no gains from reducing the 
proportion of the labour forcé in agriculture. 
' The aggregate production function strictly explains output per head of labour forcé. This could be 
calculated from output per head using the labour forcé participation rate to transform the population 
per head data, The participation rate and national labour forces are assumed exogenous in this model 
Over a longer period of time than the years 1860-1910 that would probably misleading but it could be 
a convenient simplification. 
Let R = Labour Force/Population, k = log of capital, 1 = log of labour, pop = population and iUit 
the illiteracy Índex, then the production function in logarithms is 
q = a,, + a,k + a^í 1 + a,illit) + ... 
q - 1 = a,)+ a,k + ( t t j - 1)1 +a2a, Ulit + ... 
= q - r - pop = a„ + a, k + (a^ - 1) (r + pop) + a^a, illit + ... 
In practice the accuracy and availability of the data suggested output per head data would be pre-
ferable. 
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FIGURE 3 





The proportion of the work forcé in agriculture depends upon average agri-
cultural productivity, for that determines how much produce can be suppLed to the 
non-agricultural sectors •". Agricultural productivity is likely to have been affected 
by climate. Within countries climate may vary quite markedly as between 
Marseilles and Paris, but generaUy there are few possible histoncal observaron 
points -usually national capitals- to choose from •'. The vanatior, over the year, 
or between say January and July, is likely to be less sensitive to the ocation in the 
country at which it is measured however, and it is this monthly difference, rather 
than the annual average, that is likely to matter for soil moisture. Demand for 
non-agricultural output pulís workers out of agriculture, whJe agricultural output 
demand holds them back. Population growth increases both agricultural demand 
and labour forcé. Thus general capital supply, infrastructure and policy variables 
~ ^ ^ ^ ¿ i ; ¡ ; ; ; e a s u r e s of agncultural productivity are no less unce«ain t^ ^^^^^^ 
ar,d Prados (1992) estimate Spa.r,s agricultural labour product.v.ty faUs between 68.1 /o and 106.7 
of Italy's. 
" Data from Smithsonian Institute (1927). 
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such as tariffs will influence the sectorial distribution of the workforce. Late nine-
teenth century European proportions of the male forcé occupied in agriculture, 
forestry and fishing reflect the relative strengths of the opposing forces (as well as 
the idiosyncrasies of census classifications). Spain's agricultura! labour forcé pro-
portion rose between 1860 and 1877 before falling to Italian levéis in 1910. Thanks 
to international specialisation, high income Denmark's proportion reached a máxi-
mum of 50.5% in 1896 compared with low income Portugal at 65% in 1890 and 
Britain's 9% by 1910. 
Turning to the other great natural resource of nineteenth century Europe, 
coal, if deposits were not exploited then they could not have contributed to eco-
nomic growth. Production per head of population therefore is a better indicator of 
coal resource abundance than deposits. Known deposits are likely to depend upon 
the intensity of search which in tum will depend on demand. Although production 
depends upon infrastructure development, coal output differences between coun-
tries are not solely determined by infrastructure but also by geology and trade. Coal 
output per head shows Britain as an outlier, with more than double the 1910 valué 
of her nearest rivals, Germany and Belgium. But low income Spain mined more 
than richer Sweden or Italy, and Austria-Hungary more than France. Trade allowed 
coal consumption per head in Italy by 1910 at 0.29 metric tons almost to match 
Spain's consumption of 0.32 metric tons. 
Railways made the greatest demands upon capital and integrated national 
markets (O'Brien, 1982). The determinants of national railway sizes can be divided 
into supply and demand side influences. The demand is mainly derived from the 
production function. Britain was rather exceptional in the proportion of passenger 
traffic carried on her railways. Large countries had reason to take more advantage 
of raUways, other things being equal, than small. Distances between population cen-
tres and natural resource locations were inevitably shorter in small countries and 
therefore less capital was needed in railways to join them up to créate a given 
productivity level. Railway length is therefore deflated by área in the present 
model. For two countries with the same sized railway sistem, the one with the hig-
her population density would be better served, for willingness to pay for average 
haul or trip lenght would be lower; the same number of people can be reached in a 
smaller área. Denmark, like the Netherlands, was a precocious railway builder 
between 1860 and 1910, overtaking Spain in the ranking, although by far the den-
sest network at both dates was to be found in Belgium. 
The área of a country is also pertinent to foreign trade, for with a given degree 
of specialisation, división of labour and therefore productivity, a larger economy 
would trade less with other nations. Controlling for country size, openness to 
foreign trade is a good Índex of productivity and income per head, but it does not 
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indícate what is responsible for the income per head and therefore adds nothing to 
the explanation. Railways, by contrast were the means by which the market was 
widened and productivity boosted. i, j i j 
Interest rates, as a measure of capital scarcity, presuppose weU-developed capi-
tal markets, which did not exist outside a few Western European economies. 
Instead there was the intemational market based in London where national govern-
ment bonds traded at interest rates which tended to rise with distance eastwards. 
This spatial pattern depended in part on country risk, on the likelihood of exchan-
ge rate depreciation and government default, both of wich could be diminished in 
the eyes of the market by a credible committment to the gold standard. 
Guaranteeing national currency convertibility into gold markedly increased the 
availability of capital from abroad and reduced the cost (Gregory 1979; Martín-
Aceña, 1993) '^ . For capital exporting countries, a gold standard meant higher 
returns to capital than in an economy exposed to more exchange rate uncertainty 
Probably of greater significance was the fiscal responsibÜity imphed by a Imk ot the 
national currency to precious metal. A gold standard government could not sup-
port excessive spending by printing money, and business confidence ^t home as 
well as abroad would have been enhanced. Gold conferred more stabdity than 
bimetallism or silver because of the preminence of gold standard Bntain in worW 
trade and the changing relative valúes of gold and süver after the ^ d - c e n t ^ 
Bimetallic and silver countries experienced serious monetary disorders m the 
1860S and 1870s which were likely to deter investment. These considerations sug-
gest the length of time on the gold standard may determine how high ou put pe 
head would be. But since the greater investment encouraged by the gold lii^ wü 
have beeen subject to diminishmg returns, the impact of time on adherence wiU not 
have increased without limit". Although ncher countries were more assiduous n 
mamtaining a gold link for their currencies, one of the P ° ° f ^ ' J ° " " ^ ^ f ,'^;" ,^ ^^  
the gold standard from 1854 to 1891 », and Spain only abandoned gold in 1883^ 
offermg at least two pieces of evidence that causation did not run from meóme to 
' ° ^ A ' ^ Í f r l T h f m T n m r y stance, state policy varied considerably in a number 
of respects. Policy may have influenced the level of literacy by ^ - " f - ^ - f f °°-
ling but it is the results of (lagged) literacy or lUiteracy that we "^serve 'n d.. spe-
cification. Equally policy may determine the agricultural labour productivity di-
^'^^^.é^nc. to the stlver standard tn the early part of the penod may have beet, helpful for cour,-
tries concerned to attract French capital j „,. a nventv vear cut off. Other formulations, 
- Somewhat arbitrarüy the etnpincal spec.f|catton adopts a ^ "^'V ^^^^^^ ¿^ ^^ ,he t rauo. 
taktng a starting valué of 1850, or a binary variable, do not make a great deal 
" Communication from Jaime Reis. 
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fferential, the flow of labour into the modern sector or the spread of railway net-
works but none of these possible effects is distinguished in the present model. By 
contrast some allowance is made for tariff protection, and the share of the railways 
owned by the state as independent influences on development. Ownership of rail-
ways, by far the largest user of capital, varied markedly across Europe by 1890. In 
Germany almost all were state owned, in France almost all were prívate. Spanish 
railways were operated entirely by companies but about 40% of Italian railways 
were state operated. Tariff protection was particularly high in the lowest income 
countríes, Portugal and Russia. Some of the effects of tariff protection in Portugal 
from 1890 might be captured by the slower transfer of labour from agriculture con-
sequent upon the tariff influence upon the domestic intersectorial term of trade. 
To estímate the model real output per head data (in 1970 US$) on up to 18 
European countríes at decadal intervals from 1860 and 1910 were assembled. 
Some of the output per head estimates are at least as controversial as any models 
that might be used to explain them. While Prados (1992G) judged that in 1913 
Spanish national income per head was far below Italian, Lains' (1992) survey con-
cluded that they were very similar. There is as yet no consensus on Portugal's 
growth experience between 1860 and 1910 (Lains and Reis (1992)). The figures 
employed here for Greece were taken from Dertilis (1993) and for Romanía and 
Bulgaria in 1913 (as an approximation to 1910) from Gini, as transmitted by Lains 
(1992). For the Kingdom of Austria we use Clark's estimates in (Lains (1992) 
Table Al). New data for Sweden (Krantz 1988) raises that country in the league 
markedly, while series for Spain (Prados, 1992a), and Portugal (Lains, 1989), lower 
the output ranking of those two economies. Italian GNP per head was taken from 
Prados (1992a) and Maddison (1992). Otherwise data are from Maddison (1982; 
1989 Table 1.3) (Netherlands, Finland, Swizeriand) and Crafts (1983) ". Inevitably 
there are substantial margins of errors in these estimates. 
Human capital is measured by the most readily available internationally com-
parable measure for this period which is literacy, as indicated by the bridegroom or 
bríde's ability to sign the marríage register. Other measures include literacy among 
conscripts or the general population as revealed in Census reports. Literacy data 
" Other countríes included in the 18 country data set not mentioned explicity in the paragraph are 
Belgium, Denmark, France (port-unification), Germany, Russia, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The 
conversión between different bases uses the United Kingdom's output as the "numeraire" As Lains 
(1992) points out, this conversión may be a source of error if the United Kingdom estimate is incorrect 
Crafts' output figures are for GNP whereas Maddisons are for GDP. British GDP exceeded GNP. Yet 
theGDP per head impÜed by Maddisons (1982) Table A3 and the output and population series suggest 
a slightly higher figure for 1910 than Crafts' $1320. ($68082 x 0.922)/44.916 = $1397. In both cases the 
entire United Kingdom is the unit of observation, including Ireland. 
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employed here are from Flora (1973) with linear interpolations. Literacy is an 
unambitious indicator of human capital but it is at least an appropriate direct 
Índex, unlike numbers of students or school teachers, whose productmty may 
vary with time and place. The lack of a strong simple correlation between meóme 
and literacy is helpful for the case that literacy may be treated as an exogenous rat-
her than as an endogenous variable in this period. One difficulty is to tind the 
correct conversión ratio between the three Índices, conscnpt lUiteracy, bride and 
bridegroon illiteracy and general iUiteracy CipoUa (1965) however is clear that one 
exists. There is also a matter of definitions. In nineteenth century Fmland tor ms-
tance the ability to read, although not the abiHty to write, was widespread 
(Myllantaus, 1990). Ideally a distinction would be drawn between male and téma-
le illiteracy and a range of lags tested (Núñez, 1990). None the less the general pat-
tern is clear. Germany and Scandinavia were highly literate. The Netherlands were 
more literate than Belgium. England by 1870 was only a little less literate than the 
Netherlands and more so than Trance. Spain was in a worse position than Italy in 
1880. In the 1890s weU over 60% of Russian recruits were illiterate whereas in Italy 
the figure was under 40%. 
IV. MODEL ESTIMATION AND IMPLICATIONS 
A good explanation should fit the above facts better than other accounts but 
should do so parsimoniously and in a manner consisten! with knowledge of the way 
the European economies worked. Unfortunately a truly general model would be 
enormous in view of the range of possible explanatory variables m economic deve-
lopment and the variety of ways in which they might be related. The most genera^ 
representation adopted in this experiment takes the policy variables (taritts and 
gold standard membership), illiteracy as an Índex of human capital population, 
natural resource variables (temperature and precipitation), and coal P ™ ' * " ™ 
(but not consumption) as exogenous to this (but not necessarÜy to another, higher 
level) model. Constant elasticity functional forms are assumed except in the equa-
tion for the proportion of the labour forcé in agriculture, which is semi-loganthrnic. 
As a check on the possibility of spurious regression, in addition to an LM test on 
the regression residuals, the stability of each equation is tested by removing the 
richest country from the sample. , . i 
With two or three variables the production function relation explains around 
75-80% of the variation in income per head among European countries for which 
estimates are available between 1860 and 1910 (Table 1). Although that leaves a 




Europea» Economies TSLS Regressions (Unbalanced) Panels, 
Decada I Data 1860-1910 
(A) Aggreate production function 
enp /pop = 7.31 + 0.127 coal - 1.183 [agrilab] - 0.073 illit 
(61.56) (4.72) (-4.17) 
(-5.59) s = 0.164 n = 59 
«np /pop = 7.67 + 0.014 [coal] - 2.129 [agrilab] - 0.070 Illit 
(39.83) (0.27) (-4.50) 
(-4.50) 
LM (F3,56) = 1.73 SF (6,50) = 1.44 s = 0.194 n = 59 
(B) Agricuiture 
agrilab = 0.429 - 0.074 [rail] + 0.091 tariff + 0.096 tempdif + 0.074 pop - 0.017 UK 
(2.79) (-3.79) (8.46) (2.14) 
(3.58) (-8.38) 
sse = 0.283 LM = 3.83 s = 0.0718 n = 61 
Excluding the U.K. 
agrilab = 0.396 - 0.0738 [rail] + 0.0905 tariff + 0.107 tempdif + 0.071 pop 
(2.36) (-3.61) (7.94) (2.15) 
(3.42) 
sse = 0.280 LM = 3.62 s = 0.075 n = 55 
agrilab = 0.388 - 0.054 [rail] + 0.073 tariff + 0.122 tempdif - 0.025 julyrain + 0.054 pop - 0.017 UK 
(2.33) (-2.40) (5.15) (2.56) 
(-2.45) (2.52) (-8.26) 
sse = 0.214 LM = 2.28 s = 0.070 n = 51 
(C) Railways 
rail = -0.688 + 0.785 pop + 0.193 área + 0.165 [coal] + 0.036 gold - 0.129 illit 
(1.39) (10.14) (2.72) (2.54) 
(4.27) (-3.27) 
LM = 2.35 S F = 1 . 8 2 s = 0.434 n = 71 
(D) Coal Consumption 
coal = -6 .18 + 0.658 [rail] - 0.724 pop + 0.191 coalp + 1.242 gnp/pop - 0.1383 área 
(-1.67) (2.26) (-2.79) (5.36) (2,45) 
(-0.96) 
LM = 2.95 SF = 1.42 s = 0.734 n = 67 
Notes: all variables in logarithms except "agrilab" and "uk". t statistics in parentheses. Square brackets indícate ins-
trumental variable estímate, "gnp/pop" = gross natinal product per head ín 1970 US $, "agrilab" = ratio of workcrs in 
agricuiture, forestry and fishing to total labour torce, "rail" = length of railway line, "área" = área of country. "illit" = illi-
leracy indcx, "coal" = coal consumption per head, "tariff" = average tariff (tariff rcvenue/import valué), "tempdif" = 
difference between mean July and January temperatures. "julyrain" = rainfall in July "gold" = duration of adherence to 
the gold standard since 1850, "pop" = national population, "coalp" = coal production per heard, "uk" = uk dummy 
LM is [RV(l-R)^,][(n-k)A] from the regression of squared residuals on the independent variables of the equation, 
distributed as F with k and n-k degrees of freedom, where k is the number of independent variables, 
Structural break test F test, SF(1, n-k) = [(sse*-sse)/sse].[(n-k)/l] distributed as F( 1, n-k) undcr the nuil of no bre 
ak, where 1 is the number of observations added or droppcd and sse* is the error sum of squares of the full sample 
n + 1 and sse is fot only n observations. 
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vidual countries institutions or policies, it is quite satisfactory compared with the fit 
of empirical models of more recent economic performance. lUiteracy lagged a 
decade is intended to capture human capital effects. Railways exercised no direct 
effect on output, once possible endogeneity was aUowed for. The proportion ot the 
male labour forcé in agriculture measures the impact ot the dual economy, which is 
rather strong. A fall in the agricultura proportion of the workforce from say 60 /o 
to50% raises output per headby(exp (2.13x0.1)=) 23.7%. 
The direct effect of coal consumption on production is significant when it is 
(inappropriately) assumed exogenous in estimating the function. But the impact is 
very small (the elasticity is. 014), and the coefficient is not significantly diííerent 
from zero at the 95% level of probability when the variable was assumed to be 
endogenous. 
Turning to the factor equations, larger railway networks lower the proportion 
of the workforce in agriculture, both by integrating markets and proxying the 
growth of industrial capital. Tariff protection does the opposite, encouragmg inet-
ficiency in resource allocation. Wide variations in temperature during the agricul-
tural year and low soil moisture impose burdens on agriculture that keeps pro-
ductivity low, thus raising the workforce proportion employed. Lower soil moisture 
because of low July rainfalls imposes a comparable penalty Even allowing for dit-
ferent railway penetration per head of population, climate and tariff policy, struc-
tural break tests showed the necessity for distinguishing the legacy of early market 
relations in British agriculture. 
Abundance of coal both creates a need for railways and industrial capital whi-
le at the same time providing the raw materials necessary for their cheap supp y. 
Membership of the gold standard guaranteed cheap and secure finance and low illi-
teracy ensured the necessary human capital essential to the capital goods industries. 
Coal consumption per head rose more than proportionately with GNF per 
head, because of prevailing technology. The coefficient of coal productiori, at 
0.191, indicates that International trade was important in compensating for the lack 
of coal endowments. A difference in coal production per head between countries ot 
50% was associated with only a 10 per cent difference in consumption, other 
things being equal. Transport from the coal producing áreas must have raised coal 
prices in the consuming áreas without coal but, judging by the consumption ettect, 
not apparently by a great deal. » m 
The empirical model of later nineteenth century economic development com^ 
prises four equations. In order to explain income differences between countries and 
assess counterfactual possibilities the system must be solved to yield equations in 
which only predetermined variables explain the endogenous variables. The reiation 
between the structural and the reduced form equations, where Y and Z are respec-
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tively the vectors of endogenous and predetermined variables, B and r respectively 
the coefficient matrices of endogenous and predetermined variables, and U and V 
are error term vectors, may be represented in matrix notation as follows; 
BY + rz = u ... (2) the structural system (see Appendix) 
Y = -z"' rB + V ... (3) the reduced forms. 
The principie focus of the present paper is on only one row of the system (3), 
that explaining national output per head. But as (2) and (3) make apparent, in 
general that may depend upen all other equations and variables in the system. The 
structure of model is shown in Figure 4. It could be inferred from a selective rea-
ding of the literature on European economic development in the later nineteenth 
century, but the presentation here has the advantage of being systematically related 
to the available facts. 
FIGURE 4 




Gold standard tariffs 
Religión/Culture 
railways proportion of labour forcé in agricultura literacy 
productivity 
Errors in the measurement of the explanatory variables may requires the para-
meter valúes be interpreted with some caution since they may be biased. Subject to 
that proviso, we can examine the properties of the model by simulating it, to show 
how a poorly performing nineteenth century European economy, such as Spain, 
would have developed by 1910 if it had adopted one by one, the policies of the lea-
der economy, Britain, the human capital and the natural resources (Table 2). There 
are two alternative paths; one is to use the reduced form implied by the structural 
equations, the other is to 'retrodict' with a reduced form estimated direcdy. The 
two approaches should offer some check on the appropriateness of the model '^ . 
"• Because the correlation between logarithm of population and labour forcé was 0.989, only 
population was used as an instrumental variable and as predetermined variable in the directly estimated 
reduced form equation for output, although both were assumed exogenous. 
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TABLE 2 
Proporttonate increase in Spanish GN? per head tn 1880 and 1910 tfSpain 
achieved UK valúes of exogenous variables 
1880 1910 
Dtrect From Dnec, From 
reduccdform structural model reduced form structural model 
lUneracy 9.4% 8,8% 24.7% 22.9 ^ 
Tariffs 20 .5% 22.5% 20.4% 223 /o 
Gold standard 0.6% 0.5% 1-0% ^J/° 
Soilmosture 40.7% 36.5% 50.0% 46.6 /o 
(temperature variation 
and July rainfall) 7 7 ° / 
Coal production 4.5 % 3.3 % 3.7 % -^ " 
Notes; Calculated by exponentmting the difference between valúes of bgged vanables or UK ^ j S p ^ 
multipled by regression coefficients. The impact of the gold standard depends cr.t.cally "PO" ^^ethe 
duration on the standard matters (and persists), assumed here, or on whether there was a once and 
all impact. In the second case the effect becomes comparable to the taritt. 
Although the theoretically correct specification is to explain output per worker, 
both in the aggregate production function and in the reduced form equation, the 
loss of degrees of freedom and the difficulties of identifying and standardising 
workers implied that GNP per head of population was in practice a preterable 
variable. , 
The reduced form GNP per head (see Appendix) implied by the structural 
equations in logs is: 
gnp/pop = - 0.106 illit - 0.212 Tariff + 0.008 Gold - 0.577 Tempdif + 0.010 
Goalprd - 0.045 Área + 0.015 Pop 
Directly estimated reduced forms are: 
gnp/pop = - 0.121 illit - 0.173 Tariff + 0.007 Gold - 0.384 Tempdif + 0.022 Coalprd -
(-7.87) M.09) (1.89) (-3.26) (2.38) 
-0.013 área+ 0.012 Pop. 
(-0.35) (0.32) 
n - 67 R2 = 0.77 LM = 1-78 
Structural break F test for exclusión of the UK F = 2.32, Pooi (^'54) = 3.1 • 
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gnp/pop = - 0.121 illit - 0.176 tariff + 0.007 gold - 0.215 tempdif+ 0.016 coalprd -
(-8.71) M.59) (2.00) (-1.85) (1.94) 
- 0.025 área + 0.010 pop + 0.018 UK 
(-0.72) (0.28) (3.70) 
n - 6 7 L M = 1.84R2 = .834 
gnp/pop = - 0.099 illit - 0.150 tariff + 0.007 gold - 0.253 tempdif + 0.064 julyrain + 
(-6.58) (-3.58) (1.99) (-2.13) (2.72) 
+ 0.010 coalprd - 0.028 área + 0.019 pop + 0.017 UK 
(0.97) (-0.73) (0.52) (3.32) 
n = 56 R^  = .85 R^  = .82 LM = 1.42 
The reduced form iUiteracy elasticity of output per head or worker is around 
0.1. The coefficient on the gold standard of .007-008 implies little output gain from 
adhering to the gold standard (but the apparent gain is large if a binary measure, 
instead of a duration related specification, is adopted). The soil moisture proxy, 
temperature variation, elasticity is large, between 0.21 and 0.58, and the upper end 
of the range is favoured when the July rainfall measure supplements temperature 
difference. The coal production elasticity is invariably small, around 0.01-0.02, in 
contradiction to those accounts that regard the presence or absence of coal deposits 
as central to nineteenth century economic development. The UK dummy captures 
the historical legacy that contributed to the low proportion of labour in the agri-
cultural sector by the beginning of the period. 
There are two reasons why the model does not fit the data exactly and there-
fore why it does not predict precisely the output per head of later nineteenth cen-
tury Spain or Britain; errors in the measurement of output and unique national 
policies or characteristics. However a comparison can be made independently of 
these unique influences by calculating the contributions of the exogenous variables 
to the Spanish-UK output differential (Table 2). Since country characteristics may 
be positive or negative, even if Spain adopted UK valúes for all exogenous variables 
in the model the differential would not be exactly explained; it may be over-or 
under-determined depending upon the net impact of the two country-specific fac-
tors. 
The five variables account for rather more than half of the measured differen-
ce in output per head of population in 1880. The remainder of the Spanish-UK di-
fferential is left to be explained by institutions, policies and other characteristics not 
captured by this model, as well as by measurement errors. Country-specific cha-
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racteristics include those factors, captured by the UK dummy that reduced the 
British workforce in agriculture so much more than in the rest of Europe by 1860. 
The two approaches both indicate that nineteenth century liberal economic poli-
cies, represented by low tariffs {but not a more persistent committment to the 
gold standard) would have raised output per head by about one fifth (Spain was on 
the gold standard from 1877 until 1883). Natural resources, as measured m the pre-
sent model, were of greater importance. Goal and weather gave Britam a 40 or 45 
per cent advantage over Spain in 1880, but climate had ten times the impact of geo-
logy. The cultural inheritance as captured by literacy rates mattered much less in 
1880. Perhaps Spain would have gained an extra one tenth of output per head with 
British levéis of literacy Further investigation with longer lags and literacy disa-
ggregated between males and females (Núñez, 1990) may change this result however. 
By 1910 liberal economic policies no longer dominated the sources of the out-
put gap. The contribution of the literacy gap more than doubled and the climatic 
handicap increased, whUe the proportionate impact of differential tariff poücies on 
the income gap remained unchanged. 
V. CONCLUSIÓN 
The preceding section suggests a causal pattern of nineteenth century 
European economic development. The model is both simple and sufficiendy gene-
ral to encompass a number of earlier explanations. With so many countnes and so 
many possible relevant variables, the direct processing limitations of the mmd 
require support from formal methods to sort the specificadons that fit historical 
experience from those that do not. Simplicity, rather than exhaustive descriptive 
accuracy, is essential to address the range of economic data generated by nineteenth 
century Europe. At the same time the model offers a partial account ot "*3'there 
were leader and follower economies and the sources of catching up and talling 
behind, rather than merely describing the pattern. By identifying the relative con-
tribution of variables to output per head, the model aUows a distmction between 
equally attractive alternative, and inferior, roads to development. At the same time 
the approach can cast light on a variety of apparently competing explanations; tho-
se based on politics, on insdtutions, on coal and on literacy. Liberal economic 
policies (low tariffs) are cleariy associated with stronger ^^""«^-J P f T l f n'oTn 
may be even more pervasive. These findings are consistent ^ * MulhaUs (1881) 
more specific conclusions about the Spanish economy around 1880, 
"It would be only necessary to seU or emancipare her colonies dismiss one half 
of the public employees and renounce the system of persecuting foreign vessels m 
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Spanish ports: then Spain would rapidly rise in the scale of nations from her pre-
sent low rank" '^ 
The emphasis on economic liberalism does not preclude a contribution from 
literacy. Despite the ubiquity of coal as a source of energy and heat, possession of 
substantial coal deposits mattered litde for economic development, but climate 
mattered a great deal. Judging by the proportion of output per head not accounted 
for by the model, national institutions and other (non-tari£f and gold standard) poli-
cies retain a large role in explanations of nineteenth century development, but 
one whose magnitude is potentially less precise '*. 
Because the parameter estimation is probabilistic, the conclusions do not 
require the national output measures be free from errors, ñor is the model propo-
sed here anything more than a beginning. That the units of observations are not 
internally homogenous does not invalídate the exercise. AU that is required is that 
differences between national economies be greater than those within, a condition 
that is suggested by the long term consequences of national policies, institutions 
and culture, which have shaped nationally distinctive European economic styles. 
Undoubtedly more precise indicators of both dependent and independent variables 
are necessary; regional indicators could gready improve the data set. There is a dan-
ger that some important variables, such as genpral taxation per head, are excluded 
from the model because their measures are too imperfect rather than because they 
lack explanatory power. But to ignore what is currently available is to fail to recog-
nise the provisional nature of all scientific results. 
Summarising the qualitative conclusions, the proximate determinants of output per 
head differences between European countries and over the years 1860 and 1910 con-
firm the role of the dual economy, of climate, of economic liberalism and of human 
capital. Railways and physical capital were influenced by whether a country was on the 
gold standard or not and by national coal endowment. The proportion of the work for-
cé in agriculture, reflecting agricultural productivity, depended upen tariff protection 
and soil moisture. So in the present model the ultímate determinants of European 
nations' output per head were climate, tariff protection, very marginally the gold stan-
dard, coal and literacy, together with other country specific factors and perhaps varia-
bles not considered in this analysis. The background conditions of the model and the 
" Mulhall felt the same policy of liberaüsation was needed for Portugal; "... incidence of taxation is 
overwhelming... MiÜtary expenditure is enormous... It might be reduced by giving up such useless pos-
sessions as Mozambique and Goa." 
'* Other, higher level, models may subsume the present attempt. So in a more general structure, 
economic policies may be endogenous; membership of the gold standard may be explained by lagged 
economic or current political variables for instance. In the limit the more general model might depend 
only on past unique events and it becomes akin to path dependent, or non-ergodic, growth models. 
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counterfactuals it supports are the state of technology, society and institutional envi-
ronment of later nineteenth century Europe. More generaUy the contribution of nine-
teenth century liberal policies for economic development among systemaüc influences 
seem to be confirmed, coal is demoted and soU moisture appears as a key determinant. 
APPENDIX 
The Model 
By + rz = U 
-1 p, 





































































- r = 
0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 -0.054 -0.073 0.000 -0.122 0.025 0.000 
0.000 0.138 0.724 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.191 
0129 -0193 -0 785 0.000 -0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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